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1 Introduction
Monetary authorities set interest rates and control market liquidity conditions by engag-
ing in appropriate open market operations. These operations are implemented either by
outright monetary transactions and/or by reverse transactions, i.e., repos that are settled
via tenders. Although outright transactions seem to be the most preferred way to deal
with systemic liquidity problems (i.e., ECB's Outright Monetary Transactions to address
the EU sovereign debt crisis), it is through reverse transactions that interest rates are set.
Reverse transactions involve the purchase and resale of securities at prespecied price and
for a short period of time. Nevertheless, these transactions are not dierent from stan-
dard collateralized loans. Collateralized securities ought to have adequate market value,
at least equal to the money value of loans. These securities may be bonds or equities that
fulll certain credit risk criteria. Monetary authorities specify credit rating requirements
according to which securities are qualied as appropriate collateral. Arguably, the credit
risk of collateralized securities plays an important role for the quantity of money that is
extended to the real economy.
This study challenges the eciency of reverse transactions as a monetary instrument when
the securities market is distressed. The argument is simple. It is customary for the mon-
etary authorities to enhance market liquidity by oering \cheap" money. However, this
might turn to be insucient, if market participants possess securities of poor credit rating.
We show that credit rating downgrading may reverse the intended consequences of OMT of
securities for liquidity extension. Put dierently, monetary authorities should balance the
trade o between securities eligibility and their associated credit risk. We address these
anomalies by developing a monetary model with nancial assets along the lines suggested
by Dubey & Geanakoplos (1992, 2003, 2005, 2006). Monetary economies with incomplete
markets and nominal assets, nevertheless, characterized by indeterminacy (Geanakoplos
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& Mas-Colell , 1989). The introduction of at money via cash-in-advance constraints is
one way to remove this indeterminacy. Magill & Quinzii (1992) introduce a \sell-all"
trading mechanism, where all individuals sell all of their endowments to some Central
Exchange that processes and clears all trades. A dierent way to restore determinacy
was proposed by Dubey & Geanakoplos (2006) that made use of outside money (each
individual starts with money endowments).Finally, Lin et al. (2015) argue that positive
default in equilibrium is sucient to establish determinacy. This paper follows the second
method.
The role of collateralized securities in market based models has been extensively addressed
in the literature. However, the precursors to our framework are Geanakoplos & Zame
(2014) and Bottazzi et al. (2012) . Geanakoplos & Zame (2014) assume nancial as-
sets backed by a durable good and, fundamentally provide the theoretical underpinnings
for introducing asset backed securities (ABS) in a general equilibrium context. Equally
important is the introduction of nancial assets backed by other nominal securities in Bot-
tazzi et al. (2012). The latter introduces naturally repo markets in a general equilibrium
framework and explains how rehypothecation of securities by agents that go long in repos
increases their leverage. In fact, rehypothecation explains very well the importance of
reverse transactions for the transmission of monetary policy.
Section 2 sets out a monetary model where open market operations occur. Section 3 denes
the equilibrium and the existence result is proved. Section 4 examines the continuity
properties of monetary operations. Finally, Section 5 oers our concluding results.
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2 The model
Consider an exchange economy that extends over two periods t 2 f0; 1g. There are n
possible states at date 1, S = fs0; s1; : : : ; sng, with s0 denoting the state at date 0. In
each state there are L consumption commodities available, and hence the commodity
space is RLS . On this stochastic structure, we assume a continuum of individuals de-
ned as the positive and compact subset of real line I. Following Aumann (1964), we
equip the measurable space (I; I) with the standard Lebesgue measure . Individuals
are atomless, however we additionally assume that I is partitioned into k types having
strictly positive measure, I = [jkIj with Ii \ Ij = ; for all i; j. Individuals have pref-
erences representable by utility functions U i : RLS+ 7! R, dictated by the axioms of von
Neumann and Morgenstern theorem, i.e. state separable utility functions. Each individ-
ual is endowed with an initial bundle of commodities and initial holdings of at money,
w = (wi(s);m(s)i) 2 RL+1S . We assume that endowments are bounded away to inn-
ity. Individuals sharing the same type are identical with respect to their characteristics,
i.e. preferences and endowments, while all types are symmetric with respect to their in-
formation given by a common prior  over the states. In this setup, given the price
system of commodities p = (: : : ; p(s); : : :) 2 RLS+ , individuals opt for a consumption plan
xi = (: : : ; xi(s); : : :) 2 RLS+ .
The securities market. There are J  S nominal securities available, described by
their state dependent payo at date 1. A nominal security is dened by the function
yj : S n fs0g 7! R+ and the asset payos matrix by y = (: : : ; y(s); : : :) 2 RJSnfs0g.
Payos are denominated in at money and assume no-arbitrage security prices given by
the vector  = (: : : ; (s); : : :) 2 RJ+. Typically, an individual will hold a portfolio of
securities i 2 RJ .
The central bank. In our exchange economy at money is the stipulated means of
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exchange. There is a monetary authority, which we call the central bank (or simply the
bank), having the exclusive permission to print paper money. Moreover, central bank is
the sole nancial intermediary that lends money, if needed. Specically, all consumption
decisions should defer a Clower type cash-in-advance constraint. Essentially we postulate
that individuals cannot spend more for purchases than their money possessions (outside
money). Whenever they are willing to spend more than their money holdings, the central
bank creates inside money by credit, i.e. it gives loans to individuals. Finally, the central
bank is also be responsible to implement monetary policy by regulating money balances
by appropriately dened monetary operations.
What is dierent in this model is that credit is provided by reverse transactions. In short,
an individual i borrows ci monetary units by issuing bonds of face value i. The central
bank buys the bonds, once they are backed by securities of equal value and of certain
credit quality (probability of default). All in all, the monetary policy parameters will be
given by the pair (M; d), where M  +1 is the supply of credit for period t and d 2 [0; 1]
is the threshold probability of default of the collateralized securities. The ex ante nominal
interest rate is endogenously determined by the
1 + r =
Z
I
i
M
: (1)
The credit risk. Individuals may default, i.e. they may overdraft, becoming unable to
deliver their obligations. In an no-arbitrage economy with no credit risk, state prices (or
risk neutral probabilities) j for each security yj can be calculated as the inner product
j  y0j = j , i.e. the expected payo (no discounting). Allowing credit risk the expected
payo becomes
 j  0+ (1   j)jy0j = j )  j = 1 
j
j  yj ; (2)
with scalar  j  0 denoting the probability of default of security yj . When  j is strictly
positive, j should encompass the risk premium borne by individual holders.
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We put emphasis on the credit risk of inside money, i.e. the risk the central bank is
exposed when buys debt. It is anticipated that rational individuals will prefer to default
whenever the value of collateralized securities hold by the central bank falls short in value
compared to their debt.
The collateralized securities. Not all securities can play eectively the role of the
collateral. Securities are normally priced to reect their credit risk, hence high risk secu-
rities are sold at discount. The central bank would preferably not accept securities that
are associated to a high probability of default. Formally, monetary authorities stipulate
some threshold probability of default d that would be used as an eligibility criterion for
securities accepted for collateral. It is imperative to examine the eectiveness of monetary
parameter d viz. the securities market conditions.
Dene by j =
R
I maxfij ; 0g the long market portfolio for security j and by  = (j)j2J
the overall long market portfolio. The securities market value in nominal terms can be
calculated for nite security prices , and equals to F =   , with F 2 R++. It is also
useful to calculate the relative size securities possess in the total market size.
Denition 1 The securities distribution  =

j j
F

j2J
gives the relative shares the se-
curities hold across the market.
In securities distribution we primarily interested in their distribution with respect to their
credit risk. Therefore, it is useful to partition the market size in security equivalence
classes with respect to their credit risk. Dene the set of mutually disjoint sets J = fj0 2
J j j =  g. The relative size of class J will be  =
P
j2J j . Some securities classes
may possess an important share of the market, i.e. sovereign debt which share a small
probability of default compared to the equities that may share a higher one. Equivalently,
we could use a partition according to credit ratings classication, nevertheless default
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probabilities are far more versatile for our purposes.
Another fact that we would like to model explicitly is the bimodal and sometimes multi-
modal distribution of securities with respect to their credit risk. There are dierent groups
of securities with diverse credit characteristics. The following denition guarantees that
securities are not distributed uniformly across  . Let 1d be the indicator function, taking
value 1 when   d, and 1d   =
P
j2J 
 d
j .
Denition 2 The securities distribution  will be called unbalanced if for some d and
d0 2 V neighborhood of d, there exists  > 0 such that j1d    1d0  j > ,
For a small change in the probability of default criterion, the measure of the securities that
conform the threshold value changes abruptly. The central bank denes what securities
will be eligible for collateralization by appropriately choosing the probability of default
threshold. For a low probability of default threshold, only the high quality securities can
play the role, while as the d increases, more and more securities become eligible.
Denition 3 The value of eligible market portfolio is
F e = 1d    F for 1d =
8<: 1 if  j  d0 if  j > d : (3)
Eventually, the tender rate [eq. (1)] is sensitive to changes in d and thus is restated as
rt

(M;d); 

=
Z
I
i
minfM;F eg   1: (4)
The formation of the nominal interest rate depends on both policy parameters M and d.
When the money supply M is less than the eligible market value F e, the probability of
default threshold plays no role and the formula is reduced to the standard case of eq.(1).
7
There are sucient eligible securities to use as collateral. To the contrary, when M > F e
then individuals have no sucient collateral to borrow the total M .
2.1 The market mechanism
For clarity, we provide the actions taken by individuals in the dierent stages of the
mechanism.
Date 0
In security markets, individual i bids ij for acquiring security j while oers for sale 
i
j
contracts of the same security. Wash sales are permitted, i.e. individuals can be at both
sides of the market simultaneously. Security prices obtained are
j =
8<:
R
I 
i
j=
R
I 
i
j if
R
I 
i
j > 0
0 otherwise
(5)
For prices , the portfolio possessed by individual i will be
ij =
8<:
ij
j
  ij if j > 0
0 otherwise
(6)
Then, spot commodity markets open. Each individual i places a bid of money bi(0) for
the purchase of commodities and oers a quantity qi(0) of each commodity to be disposed
for sale. For t = 0,
pl(t) =
8<:
R
I b
i
l(t)=
R
I q
i
l(t) if
R
I q
i
l(t) > 0
0 otherwise.
(7)
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The consumption plan for commodity l is
xil(t) =
8<: wil(t)  qil(t) +
bil(t)
pl(t)
l 2 L
 Pl2L bil(t) +Pl2L pl(t)qil(t) m (8)
Actions taken at date 0 are determined by the budget set of individual i:
i(0) = f((i; i); ci; (bi(0); qi(0))) 2 R2J R+ R2L
; ci(0)  0; qil(0)  wil(0);
X
l2L
bil(0) + 
i  mi(0) + 
i
1 + rt
;
i; i  0g (9)
Notice that the tender rate rt determines the money market conditions in the budget
constraint (9).
Date 1
The spot commodity markets open. No transactions take place in security markets. The
budget set of individual i is
i(1) =
n
(bi(1); qi(1))) 2 R2L ; qil(1)  wil(1);
X
l2L
bil(1)  mi(1) + p(0)qi(0)
+ iy  minfi; i~yig
o
for i~yi the value of collateralized securities, owned by trader i. Individuals pay back their
debt only if the value of collateralized securities exceeds the debt. Otherwise, they always
prefer to default.
Here, the revenues from sales have no value for the individuals since there is no more
trade. Money balances that are collected in date 1, are used by individuals to collect
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their fraction of gold from the central bank that has intrinsic value and can be consumed
immediately.
In summary, the strategy set of individual i is i = i(0)  i(1), with generic element
i.
. buy/sell securities
sell asset-backed bonds to the CB
buy/sell commodities (spot)
state is revealed/securities pay
credit market clears/conscations if needed
buy/sell commodities (spot)
game is nalized
date 0
date 1
Figure 1: The timeline of market mechanism
The payo function. The payo function of individual i in period t is no dierent from
her utility function, V i
 


= U i

x
 


.
3 Monetary equilibrium with credit risk
The equilibrium concept for the model is dened.
Denition 4 We say that a strategy prole  2  is a strategic monetary equilibrium
with credit risk if for a set of monetary parameters (M;d) for all i 2 I:
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1. V i(i;  i)  V i(i;  i) for all i 2 i
2.
R
I w
i(s) =
R
I x
i(s) for all s 2 S
3.
R
I 
i = 0
4. 1 + rt =
R
I
i
minfM;F eg
The strategic equilibrium requires the market clearance of (2) spot commodity markets,
(3) security markets and (4) credit (inside money) market.
Next we prove that the strategic monetary equilibrium with credit risk always exists. We
state the following assumptions:
A1. V i is continuous, strictly monotone and quasi-concave
A2. mi(t) > 0 and mi(t)1
A3. We consider no-arbitrage security prices, i.e.  2 intH+  RJ , with H the subspace
of RJ spanned by vectors y(s).
Assumption A3 is a rather mild assumption. In fact, having assumed an atomless economy,
no individual can unilaterally aect security prices.
We dene the proper subset of ,
f =
n
 2 j s.t.
Z
I
wi(s) =
Z
I
xi(s) and
Z
I
i = 0
o
:
The subset f is bounded since  is bounded. It is also closed and hence compact. Each
individual aims to maximize its payo for known policy parameters (M;d). The best
response correspondence Bi : f  R+  [0; 1] 7! i maps the best response strategy for
some strategy of the rest of the economy  i. Dene B() :=
Q
kK B
k() for the k types.
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Lemma 1 The set of feasible strategy proles f is nonempty, convex and compact.
Proof. By Assumption (A2) it is easy to verify that the strategy sets are non empty.
Clearly, by the linearity of constraints are also convex. For compactness, it suces to
prove that the strategy sets are compact.
Types of individuals have positive measure, hence we proceed by considering an arbitrary
individual of type k. The action set of k at date 0 is bounded. Indeed, money supply is
bounded from above, i.e. M  1, hence for the type k, ck  M . By assumption (A2),
outside money is nite as well. Hence, both
P
l2L b
k(0) and
P
j2J 
k(0) are bounded away
to innity. Also, qkl (0) < w
k
l (0) for all l 2 L.
Following Werner (1985), nonarbitrage security prices (Assumption A3) are bounded and
individuals are constrained to choose nite portfolios. As result, k  mi(0) + i1+r ,
therefore k(0) is compact. Using the same reasoning k(1) is compact as well. The
result follows for the Cartesian product of all types  = kKk. The f is obviously
closed and proper subset of , hence it is compact. 
Lemma 2 The best response correspondence B is nonempty and convex valued.
Proof. First we prove that B is convex. Consider two strategies for an individual of
arbitrary type k, k and 0k with both (k;  k); (0k;  k) 2 f . By (A1), V is quasi-
concave, hence there is  2 (0; 1) such that
V k(k + (1  ) k;  k)  minfV k(k;  k); V k(0k;  k)g:
We conclude that the strategy k + (1   ) k is an element of Bk, hence the latter is
convex. The Cartesian product of convex sets preserves convexity.
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The correspondence B is also nonempty. We proved that f is compact. By (A1) V k is
continuous. By Weierstrass theorem, it is known that a continuous function has always a
maximal element in a compact set, and therefore it is nonempty. 
Lemma 3 The best response correspondence B is upper hemicontinuous (u.h.c).
Proof. By lemma (1), the set of feasible strategies is nonempty, convex and compact. By
assumption (A1), V i is continuous. By applying the Maximum theorem (Berge , 1963)
we easily obtain that Bk( i;M;d) = f0i 2 ijV i(0i;  i)  V ii(i;  i)g is upper
hemicontinuous. 
Theorem 1 The strategic monetary equilibrium with credit risk always exists.
Proof. By lemmas (2) and (3) we know that the best response correspondence is convex
valued and u.h.c. It is also compact as a proper subset of a compact set. We apply the
Kakutani's theorem to the correspondence B, thus we obtain a xed point  2 B(). 
4 Continuity properties of monetary operations
The presence of outside money (money endowments) guarantees that at money has pos-
itive value and monetary policy may have real eects to the economy. An increase in
money supply creates more opportunities for trade and the opposite occurs when the cen-
tral bank mops up excess liquidity. The key dierence from other monetary models is that
here the monetary policy is eective but in a discontinuous fashion. The argument goes
as follows. A small decrease in d (threshold of probability of default) may discard a large
share of eligible securities for collateralization. Individuals possessing these non-eligible
securities are essentially blocked from participating to money tenders and thus less money
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is channeled into the economy. As a result, a small change in monetary parameter d may
aect abruptly the disposed money income and the budget set of individuals may get
enormously tightened (or relaxed for an increase in d).
We dene a family of correspondences that attribute the eect of monetary policy upon
the budget set of individuals. For arbitrary individual i dene the correspondence, Mi :
R+ 7! S with S  R2J  R+  R2L, which we call money supply correspondence. For
dierent values of M the correspondence maps the budget of i at date 0. Respectively,
dene the quality of collateral correspondence, QCi : [0; 1] 7! S, which maps the budget
set of i for dierent values of the probability of default threshold d. Overall, the monetary
policy instruments will be attributed by the policy mix rule given by the pair (Mi;QCi).
We examine the continuity properties of the policy mix rule. Once continuous, small
changes of the policy parameters will not cause abrupt variations to the purchasing power
of individuals.
We start by characterizing the money supply correspondence and prove that it is a con-
tinuous correspondence.
Lemma 4 For arbitrary individual i, the money supply correspondence Mi is compact-
valued.
Proof. Fix M to be bounded away from innity. Notice that F e is always nite for nite
security prices. By equation (4) it is 1 + rt =
R
I 
i=minfM;F eg. Substituting into the
budget constraint (9) it becomes
X
l2L
bil(0) + 
i  mi(0) + 
iR
I 
i
minfM;F eg
Trivially, the budget set at date 0 is closed. It suces to prove that it is also bounded.
From the right hand side of the inequality, outside money mi is always bounded away from
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the innity. Fix  = maxf1; 2; : : : ; kg for the k types. Evidently, R
I 
i is bounded by 1
and therefore inside money for all individual is bounded by R
I 
i minfM;F eg. As a result
the budget set is bounded, hence by the Heine-Borel theorem it is compact. 
Lemma 5 For arbitrary individual i, the money supply correspondence Mi has a closed
graph.
Proof. If the money supply is inactive, i.e. M > F e, the lemma is trivially satised.
We examine the case where M < F e. Let (Mn) be a sequence such that Mn ! M and
sequence of actions (in) where 
i
n ! i and in 2 Mi(Mn). If the function Mi has a
closed graph it ought to be that in the limit i 2Mi(M).
Since i is bounded and closed then there exists an open neighborhood of Mi(M), V1
and some n such that for all n  n it is Mi(Mn) 2 V. It follows that in 2 V for all
n  n. Hence there is a converging subsequence inq ! v such that v 2 V.
Suppose now that the function has not a closed graph, i.e. i =2 Mi(M). Then, there is
a closed neighborhood of i, V0 which evidently it is that there is no 
i
n belonging in V0 ,
hence v =2 V0 . For  < 0 this contradicts that there is a converging subsequence which
arises from the closedness of i. 
The next lemma is necessary to prove the lower hemi-continuity of the money supply,
i.e. a small decrease in money supply M will not implode the money budget of individu-
als. Lower hemi-continuity is equivalent to the openess of the lower inverse image of the
mapping.
Lemma 6 For arbitrary individual i, the lower inverse set fM 2 R+jMi(M) \ Ug is
open for every open U 2 S.
1V = fij inf 2Mi(M) d( ; i) < g, under the standard metric.
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Proof. Openess requires that for every open subset U with Mi(M) \ U 6= ; if we get an
arbitrary element M 0 in a neighborhood in M it is Mi(M 0) \ U 6= ;. Suppose this is not
the case. Hence, for open subset U with Mi(M) \ U 6= ; and M 0 in a neighborhood V of
M , it is Mi(M 0) \ U = ;.
Therefore, there is an increasing converging sequence fMng such that fMng ! M with
Mi(Mn) \ U = ;. Clearly, the budget set under the constraintX
l2L
bil(0) + 
i  mi(0) + 
iR
I 
i
Mn
will converge to the budget set under the constraint
X
l2L
bil(0) + 
i  mi(0) + 
iR
I 
i
M:
It is also clear that for suciently large n there is a Mn very close to M that Mn 2 U ,
i.e. M(Mn) \ U 6= ;. Literally, for some Mn  M the budget set under Mn is a proper
subset of the budget set under M . Contradiction. Hence all M 0 are interior and the set is
open. 
The next proposition proves continuity.
Proposition 1 For arbitrary individual i, the money supply correspondence Mi is con-
tinuous.
Proof. By the Closed Graph Theorem (see Aliprantis & Border (2007) p.561) if the range
ofMi is a Hausdor topological space and compact then it suces to prove that its graph
is closed to be upper-hemicontinuous. The range S is trivially compact (see lemma 4) and
Hausdor space as a subset of a rectangle of reals. By lemma 5,Mi is also closed. Hence,
Mi is upper hemicontinuous. In addition, by theorem (see Hildenbrand (1974) p.27 and
lemma 6 the Mi is lower hemicontinuous everywhere. The result follows. 
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Proposition 1 veries that for small adjustments in money supply M , there is not going
to have an abrupt deterioration or improvement in the purchasing power of individuals.
The next lemma illustrates that small changes in d may cause a signicant change in the
endogenously determined tender rate.
Lemma 7 When the securities distribution  is unbalanced and M > F e, then the tender
rate rt is not continuous function in d.
Proof. Suppose that rt is a continuous function in d. Then for arbitrary d, and d0 2 Vd
in an neighborhood of d, it must be the case that for every  > 0 it is jrt(d)  rt(d0)j < .
That is, Z
I
i
1d0    F    <
Z
I
i
1d    F <
Z
I
i
1d0    F + 
1
1d0    F
Z
I
i    < 1
1d    F
Z
I
i
or
1
1d0    
FR
I 
i
 <
1
1d  
1d0     > 1d   (10)
for  =
R
I 
i
F > 0.
However this is j1d     1d0  j > , which violates the assumption of unbalancedness,
when we set  = . 
The next proposition is the main result of the paper. It shows that monetary policy mix
is not continuous. For, it suces to show that the quality of collateral correspondence is
not lower hemi-continuous.
Proposition 2 For unbalanced securities distribution and arbitrary individual i. the QCi
correspondence is not l.h.c.
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Proof. To prove this result suppose a sequence (dn) in the domain of QC
i. The correspon-
dence will be not l.h.c. at some d if for some d0 2 Vd, with Vd a neighborhood of d, and
open set O  S we have QCi(d) \ O 6= ; but QCi(d0) \ O = ;.
By lemma 7 we can always nd some d such that the tender rate to be discontinuous.
This induces that the budget set
X
l2L
bil(0) + 
i  mi(0) + 
i
1 + rt
varies discontinuously, as well. For a small change in the neighborhood of d, say d0, the
tender rate will abruptly change imploding (or exploding) the budget set. Hence, we can
always nd an open set O, dened as an open ball of the suprema of the budget set for
suciently small radius , O = B(supi(0); ), such that QCi(d0) \ O = ;. 
A small change in the threshold probability of default might discard many securities that
share the same probability of default. More technically, the rank of the qualied asset
subspace decreases abruptly. In turn, the eective money supply will change drastically.
5 Concluding Remarks
The sovereign debt crisis in eurozone countries that followed the sub-prime crisis of 2008
has been partly caused by the deation of real assets prices used for secured loans and by
a signicant downside correction in nancial assets. Financial intermediaries were lacking
liquidity, interbank lending markets were strained, bond yields were soaring and there
was an escalating danger for the liquidity problem to become an insolvency problem. The
European central bank as lender of last resort, intervened by a series of unconventional
monetary policies to inject liquidity and correct the interbank market failure. Apart from
the extensive OMT, the European central bank adopted a longer term renancing facility,
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i.e., repos maturing after three to thirty six months and broaden the pool of acceptable
collateralized securities.
Our model provides the conceptual framework to address the eect of these dierent mon-
etary policies. The discontinuous eect of monetary reverse transactions caused by the
change of the quality of collateral threshold has important implications. First, an enlarge-
ment of the pool of eligible collateral reduces liquidity problems and increase nancial
stability. Financial market conditions have a decisive role in the eectiveness of monetary
policy. When there is an increase in money supply, and it is higher than the market value
of eligible collateralized assets, then the monetary policy is ineective. The central bank
can mitigate liquidity risks only if there is a sucient pool of collateral to make monetary
policy eective.
Insofar the analysis has neglected the role collateral haircut, i.e., the need for over-
collateralization. This can simply accommodated by introducing an average haircut rate
h 2 (0; 1). Thus, the tender rate takes the form,
rt

(M;d); 

=
Z
I
i
minfM;hF eg   1: (11)
Suppose that it is the case that M > F e and the central bank decides to broaden the
accepted collateral by accepting asset backed securities but for a signicant haircut. If the
accompanied haircut is too high then it might turn out that M > hF e and, thus, nothing
changes. In conclusion, it is not only the quality of collateral that aects the interest rate
but also the \velocity of collateral" as attributed by the haircut rate.
The broadening of the central bank's list of accepted collateral, however, involves several
risks. One is that the central bank repos absorb securities of poor quality, while all the
good quality securities are directed to private repos. Financial intermediaries change their
lending behavior while their balance sheets may now include assets of lower quality and
thus higher sensitivity to nancial distress. The continuing degradation of the quality of
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collateral and the longer maturities may aect adversely the nancial conditions of the
economy. To avoid these risks, we suggest that the quality of collateral or the repos ma-
turity should be indexed to the interbank market conditions (e.g., interbank rate spread),
accompanied by ecient monitoring mechanisms. Last, the central bank should pursue to
smooth out the distribution of securities, eliminating the presence of large shares of low
quality items that may cause discontinuous jumps to the tender rate.
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